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When and how can institutions lead public opinion? Scholarly controversy exists over whether even a highly
esteemed institution such as the Supreme Court can move mass opinion. In this study we use an experimental
design embedded within a representative national survey to examine these questions in a context involving multiple
institutions and multiple issues. Our findings suggest that the Court’s ability to move opinion is potent and based
on multiple processes of persuasive influence. Congress’s ability to move opinion, while conditional, is surprisingly
more potent than previously understood. Moreover, opinion change in response to institutional endorsements is
mediated by substantive political thought to a greater extent than heuristic explanations have suggested.
C
an political institutions lead mass opinion
by endorsing a certain issue position? There
remains considerable scholarly controversy
over whether even highly esteemed institutions such
as the Supreme Court can lead public opinion (e.g.,
Hoekstra 1995; Marshall 1989; Mondak 1990). Stud-
ies addressing institutional persuasion have almost
exclusively analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g.,
Baas and Thomas 1984; Hoekstra and Segal 1996;
Mondak 1990), with little work on the persuasive
abilities of other institutions. Moreover, few works
have compared the persuasive capacities of the major
institutions of government, nor has research exam-
ined the various processes of influence that might
account for institutional influence. In this study, we
suggest that the key to understanding when and how
an institution is capable of moving mass opinion is to
understand the psychological processes of persuasion
in a cross-institutional, multi-issue framework.
We address three central research questions. First,
are U.S. institutions, namely the Supreme Court and
Congress, capable of moving public opinion? Second,
under what conditions are citizens most likely to be
influenced by institutional opinion leadership? Finally,
how do the processes of persuasive influence differ
between a high-credibility institution such as the
Supreme Court, as opposed to an institution that is
perceived as less credible, such as Congress? Using a
unique, cross-institutional, experimental design em-
bedded within a representative national survey, we
examine the extent to which each institution is able
to move opinion, and the processes by which they are
able to do so. With the advantages of internal validity
conveyed by an experimental design, combined with
the generalizability of a representative national sam-
ple, we help to resolve conflicting findings in labo-
ratory studies involving student samples (Baas and
Thomas 1984; Hoekstra 1995; Mondak 1990) and
observational or quasi-experimental studies (Franklin
and Kosaki 1989; Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Marshall
1989).
Can Institutions Move Mass
Opinion?
Institutional persuasion—that is, an institution’s
ability to move people’s opinions in the direction
of the institution’s endorsement1—has largely been
confined to the study of the Supreme Court, which is
widely believed to have a ‘‘legitimating capacity,’’ that
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1As mentioned throughout the article, such persuasion may reflect a ‘‘wholesale’’ or ‘‘soft’’ opinion change. For the former, people
change from favoring to opposing an issue (or vice versa) in response to an institutional endorsement. For the latter, people shift their
degrees of favoring or opposing, e.g., from strongly opposing to opposing somewhat.
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is, to confer legitimacy by placing its stamp of ap-
proval on policies. However, in early conceptualiza-
tions of this legitimating role, the Court exercised it
by approving the policies of the other branches of
government rather than by shaping mass opinion (see
Dahl 1957). Can the Court capitalize on its ‘‘reservoir
of good will’’ (Easton 1965) to induce popular accept-
ance of governmental policies? To the extent that it
can, is this because of the Court’s high credibility and
symbolic status or some other explanation?
Early observational studies provided a dismal
view of the Supreme Court’s role as a leader of mass
opinion. Questioning the likelihood of this hypoth-
esis, many pointed to the public’s lack of awareness of
Court decisions (Adamany 1973; Kessel 1966; Murphy
and Tanenhaus 1968). In addition, other conditions
for Court-led opinion change have been suggested,
including public recognition of the Court’s guardian
role of the Constitution and public perceptions of
competence and impartiality. Given that these con-
ditions are rarely fulfilled simultaneously, one would
not expect substantial opinion leadership from this
perspective (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968).
Shifts in public opinion following many Supreme
Court decision appear to have been minimal (e.g.,
Adamany 1973; Marshall 1987, 1989). On the other
hand, experimental and quasi-experimental work on
the Supreme Court’s ability to move opinion has pro-
duced generally positive, if inconsistent, results. Con-
flicting findings have come from laboratory studies
involving student samples (Baas and Thomas 1984;
Hoekstra 1995; Mondak 1990, 1994), observational
studies in naturally occurring contexts (Adamany 1973;
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Marshall 1989),
and quasi-experimental studies (Franklin and Kosaki
1989; Hoekstra and Segal 1996). Experimental studies
suggest that under certain conditions, the Court is
capable of moving opinion in the direction of its
decisions (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001;
Hoekstra 1995; Mondak 1990, 1992, 1994). The
internal validity of these experimental studies makes
their causal claims credible, but the use of student
samples raises issues of external validity. In addition,
the results from quasi-experimental studies typically
have been confined to more limited circumstances
such as local public opinion (Hoekstra and Segal
1996) and the abortion issue (Franklin and Kosaki
1989). More recent studies have been more promis-
ing with respect to this hypothesis, with evidence in
support of institutional opinion leadership in the
context of the Court’s Bush v. Gore decision (Gibson,
Caldeira, and Spence 2003), black citizens’ opinions
on affirmative action and capital punishment (Clawson,
Kegler, and Waltenburg 2003), and black citizens’
opinions on the Court’s rulings on the University
of Michigan affirmative action cases (Clawson and
Waltenburg 2004). In all three cases, the Supreme
Court’s power of influence has been attributed to
high levels of diffuse support (see Easton 1965), or
institutional loyalty (Gibson 1989; Caldeira and Gibson
1992). Thus the Court appears capable of moving
public opinion under some circumstances, but there
are inconsistencies in results and a lack of empirical
evidence regarding the processes underlying its ca-
pacity to do so.
In contrast, evidence on Congress’s ability to
move opinion is very sparse. In a rare contribution to
this area, Hoekstra (1995) finds that unlike the Court,
Congress cannot change public opinion, and its lack
of influence is attributed to its low institutional credi-
bility relative to the Supreme Court (e.g., Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse 1995). To date, there is little addi-
tional evidence confirmingordisconfirming this finding;
it is also possible that the conditions under which Con-
gress can lead opinion have simply yet to be specified.
In order to contrast the capacity for opinion leadership
across low- and high-credibility institutions, our study
incorporates both the Court and Congress as potential
opinion leaders for the same issues in order to work
toward a more general theory of institutional opinion
leadership.
Processes Underlying Institutional
Persuasion
Based on what is known about processes of persua-
sion, under what conditions should institutions be
capable of leading mass opinion? Explanations of the
processes by which institutional endorsements affect
public opinion have been heavily influenced by dual
process models of persuasion. Although there are
minor differences between dual process models, the
crux of both the central versus peripheral model
(Petty and Cacioppo 1986a, 1986b) and the heuristic
versus systematic model (Chaiken 1980) is that there
are two distinct processes that may account for any
given opinion change: one process involves mindful
and systematic processing of substantive issue-relevant
arguments, and the other consists of the use of heu-
ristics or shortcuts, which influence opinions without
systematic processing of substantive issue-relevant
arguments. These heuristics or shortcuts can involve
a wide range of potential cues, such as the idea that
positions held by experts are more likely to be
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accurate, or that opinions espoused by a credible
source are likely to be correct. The key distinction be-
tween these two processes of persuasion is that the
use of heuristics is assumed to be a less effortful pro-
cess, without mindful processing of substantive argu-
ments about the issue, whereas systematic processing
of substantive issue arguments is a more effortful and
mindful means of rendering an opinion.
Most models of elite opinion leadership are based
on the idea that a high-credibility person or institu-
tion leads the opinions of an unknowledgeable seg-
ment of the public via heuristic processing of elite
endorsements (e.g., Gilens and Marukawa 2002;
Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Lupia and McCubbins
1998). This model suggests that the less informed
eschew active, mindful processing and rely instead on
convenient shortcuts that do not require effortful
thinking about the actual substance of an issue. When
hearing the views of a trusted institution, people are
influenced as they would be by any credible source.
By using heuristic cues, even citizens who have
thought little about an issue are able to form and
maintain sensible opinions (e.g., Lupia 1994; Lupia
and McCubbins 1998; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock
1991). People respond to elite cues because they are
ill-informed about a given controversy and/or are not
motivated to engage in systematic processing of
issue-relevant arguments. Persuasive influence that
results from cues about institutional decisions or the
opinions of political elites is often viewed as a
heuristic influence. Although political elites and their
institutions obviously make substantive arguments in
support of their positions as well, the study of top-
down elite influence has focused less on the power of
the substance of the arguments made by elites and
more on the influence they exercise simply by
supplying credible endorsements of a particular issue
position. The heuristic model is appealing in that
elites seem to fit precisely the description of the kind
of source likely to be used as a heuristic cue—at least
in theory. The term elite suggests a class of people
viewed as superior to the average person, who thus
could make up for what the average citizen lacks. Of
course, in practice, empirical evidence suggests that
eliteness is not what it used to be. There is less de-
ference to traditional mantels of authority, less respect
for government institutions (particularly Congress),
and less trust in politicians as well (Craig 1993;
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 2002; Levi and
Stoker 2000; Orren 1997). In our study, we suggest
that understanding the processes of institutional
persuasion across institutions with differing levels
of public esteem may require more complex models
of persuasion than have heretofore been applied to
this context.
We suspect that political institutions seldom have
the power to sway public opinion in as straightforward
a fashion as the heuristic model suggests. To be sure,
unreflective acceptance of institutional endorsements
does not jibe well with the predominant views most
Americans hold of their governmental institutions. It
is not safe to simply assume that any influence that
occurs because an elite source endorses a given po-
sition is a result of heuristic influence. To date, the
heuristic processing of institutional endorsements has
been inferred in a highly indirect fashion. Although we
do not doubt that high-credibility elites can influence
the opinions of the ill-informed and politically unin-
volved on some occasions, we question the wisdom of
using exclusively heuristic models of persuasion to
understand the influence of elites and institutions. We
turn next to additional alternatives.
Beyond Heuristic and Systematic
Processes
Although the heuristic/systematic and central/periph-
eral distinctions between types of persuasive influ-
ence processes are often portrayed as either/or
alternatives, these models have generated plenty of
evidence suggesting that they are not mutually ex-
clusive as is often asserted.2 In other words, it is not
the case that if an individual engages in substantive,
issue-related thinking, then the credibility of the source
of an endorsement should no longer matter nor, con-
versely, that if the person is influenced by an institu-
tional endorsement, then substantive considerations
of the issue should not matter (see Chaiken and
Maheswaran 1994). For example, if a high-credibility
2It is easy to see how the dual process models could be in-
terpreted as suggesting a trade-off between one form of influence
and the other. The ELM suggests that either message content or
peripheral cues have the primary impact on persuasion (Stiff
1986, Stiff and Boster 1987; cf. Petty et al. 1987). But it is helpful
for purposes of understanding elite cues to note that advocates of
both of these theories strongly disavow such intent. For example,
Chaiken (1980; Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly 1989) points out
that the two types of persuasive influence are not mutually
exclusive. Instead, interaction and additivity effects are also part of
the model. Interaction effects occur when heuristic cues such as
source credibility bias the processing of message content (e.g.,
Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994). Additivity effects occur when
both heuristic cues and systematic processing simultaneously
influence opinions. Additionally, from a theoretical perspective,
it is not clear why one type of processing should block or
attenuate processing of the other variety.
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institution presents an issue-relevant argument advo-
cating a particular viewpoint, that argument may
receive greater consideration and more systematic
processing than a low-credibility institution offering
the same argument. In this example, high credibility
helps the institution lead public opinion by affecting
the mindful processing of issue-relevant arguments
(Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994; Maheswaran and
Chaiken 1991). The Supreme Court, as a high-
credibility institution, could thus change opinions both
by serving as a heuristic and by enhancing the per-
suasiveness of substantive issue arguments.
In addition, another hybrid process by which
institutional endorsements may influence opinions is
by affecting the kinds of thoughts and arguments that
these announcements prompt when people hear about
an institutional endorsement of an issue position
(Petty and Cacioppo 1986a). These thoughts can, in
turn, affect people’s opinions (Brock 1967; Greenwald
1968; Petty, Ostrom, and Brock 1981). Known within
psychology as ‘‘cognitive responses,’’ these issue-relevant
thoughts can be generated by knowing what position
an institution has endorsed. People will often attempt
to understand, for example, why a particular source
would endorse a given issue position, and because they
are self-generated, these thoughts are a particularly
powerful way to change opinions (Greenwald 1968;
Lepper, Ross, and Lau 1986; Petty, Ostrom, and Brock
1981). Thus, an institutional endorsement could af-
fect the direction and/or magnitude of cognitive re-
sponse, and thereby bring about persuasion by
influencing the extent and direction of mindful and
substantive processing of issue arguments (Chaiken,
Liberman, and Eagly 1989; Chaiken and Mahaswaran
1994; Petty and Cacioppo 1986a).
In sum, past research on the ability of institutions,
and elites in general, to lead public opinion have not
sufficiently differentiated between an ‘‘empty-headed,’’
purely heuristic interpretation and a variety of other
more mindful and systematic processes that suggest a
more thoughtful citizenry more actively processing
institutional cues. Our study presents a more fully
specified design capable of distinguishing between
these various processes of influence.
Research Design
To investigate how institutional endorsements lead
mass opinion, we used an experimental design em-
bedded within a national survey, comparing the per-
suasive capacities of Congress and the Supreme Court.
The design included three experimental factors. A
three-level factor randomly assigned people to receive
an endorsement of a specific issue position from the
Supreme Court, from Congress, or no endorsement
at all. In order to avoid producing results that could
be specific to a given issue, a two-level factor
manipulated which of two issues respondents were
cued about, either affirmative action or flag burning.
A third factor manipulated whether or not the
respondent received a substantive argument for the
issue position being advocated. The design is a fully
crossed, full factorial experiment with a total of 12
experimental conditions (2 issues [affirmative action
or flag burning] 3 3 sources [Court, Congress, or
control] 3 2 arguments [present or absent]). The
online Appendix A (at http://journalofpolitics.org/)
includes further details about the wording of manip-
ulations and measurement of variables. Data collec-
tion was carried out by the staff of the Survey Center
at University of California, Berkeley between June 15
and November 4, 1994.3 A total of 854 respondents
were randomly assigned to one of 12 experimental
conditions; those who refused to answer or had no
opinions on the relevant issues were eliminated from
the sample.
Congress and the Supreme Court are assumed to
represent different levels of source credibility. While
the Court is known to maintain a relatively esteemed
standing in the eyes of the public (Caldeira and
Gibson 1992), Congress is widely known to have less
credibility (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Our own
data verified that, consistent with previous studies,
the Court maintains significantly higher levels of cre-
dibility than Congress.4
3In 1994, Congress possessed among its lowest confidence ratings
(below 20%) since the early 1970s, according to the Gallup Poll
Online (2007).
4Respondents were asked about the perceived credibility of
institutions. Control condition respondents were randomly as-
signed to receive trust and expertise questions about either the
Court or Congress, thus providing us with an untainted assess-
ment of baseline levels of perceptions toward these sources.
Expertise: ‘‘When it comes to making political decisions, IN-
STITUTION is well informed on the issues.’’ Trustworthiness:
‘‘When it comes to making political decisions, INSTITUTION
understands the concerns of people like me.’’ The order of the
two questions was randomized and responses were coded based
on a 4-point agree-disagree scale. For expertise, 69.5% of
respondents gave positive ratings to the Court, while only
43.5% of respondents gave positive ratings to Congress. For
trustworthiness, 48.8% positively rated the Court, and for
Congress, only 23.7% gave positive ratings. The mean level of
expertise attributed to the Court (mean5 2.92) was significantly
higher than the expertise attributed to Congress (mean5 2.35,
p , .01). The Court was also perceived as significantly more
credible on the trustworthiness dimension (mean5 2.44 com-
pared to Congress mean5 1.90, p , .01).
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Two controversial issues were chosen on the basis
of the significantly different levels of commitment
they elicited in a pretest survey, and because they
were issues that could credibly be addressed by either
Congress or the Supreme Court, thus making institu-
tional leadership cues plausible.5 Support for affir-
mative action (low commitment) and support for a
federal statute prohibiting flag burning (high com-
mitment) were both issues for which media carried
endorsements of particular views by Congress and the
Supreme Court during the six months preceding the
study. In the experiment, consistent with the actual
endorsements at the time, the institution (Congress
or the Court) is reported to support laws requiring
affirmative action, or to oppose laws banning flag
burning. Based on previous research, these issues
should be particularly unlikely to elicit evidence of
persuasion via elite cues. As Gilens and Murakawa
(2002) note, elite endorsements are generally influ-
ential for technical, unfamiliar issues, while issues
involving values are seldom susceptible to such
influence. Flag burning and affirmative action are
well known issues among the American public, and
for many they involve balancing competing values
such as free expression versus honoring one’s coun-
try’s symbols in the case of flag burning, and equality
versus fairness in the case of affirmative action.
To further probe the processes by which institu-
tions move opinion, we measured the amount of
issue-relevant thought taking place in response to the
information participants were given. After receiving
one of the 12 experimental manipulations and
providing an opinion on the issue, respondents were
immediately asked a ‘‘thought listing’’ question de-
signed to tap the amount of issue-relevant thought
generated in response to the experimental manipu-
lations. This method involves asking people to list
their thoughts or ideas—i.e., their ‘‘cognitive respon-
ses’’—relevant to the message topic (Brock 1967;
Greenwald 1968). The idea is to tap the thoughts of
subjects as they are exposed to potentially persuasive
messages. In order to avoid potentially inducing
opinion change in so doing, yet still ask when such
thoughts are fresh, our thought-listing question was
asked immediately after eliciting respondents’ issue
opinions (see the online Appendix A). Items were re-
corded verbatim and then later ‘‘unitized’’ into indi-
vidual units of cognitive response (Meichenbaum,
Henshaw, and Himel 1980). The number of issue-
relevant thoughts per person ranged from 0 to 4. For
our analyses, we used these to construct two addi-
tional items: (1) a dichotomous indicator of whether
the respondent engaged in issue-relevant thought or
not, and (2) a measure of the proportion of thoughts
that were consistent with the direction of the institu-
tional endorsement.6
Institutional endorsements are seldom received
in a vacuum. When media report on institutional
positions on issues, they typically attribute reasons or
rationales to those opinions (see Barnhurst and Mutz
1997). Thus, our design provides respondents with
the same kind of information they might encounter
along with an institutional endorsement in the real
world.7 The influence of institutional endorsements
often has been studied devoid of political substance,
in a sense stacking the deck in favor of heuristic
processes of persuasion. To avoid this we include an
issue argument factor that randomly assigns people
to receive (or not) a rationale along with their
institutional endorsement. In this way we separate
effects of political substance that may bring about
agreement via mindful processing from those of
institutional credibility alone. Inclusion of this experi-
mental factor also allows us to examine the influence
of institutional endorsements in a richer, more sub-
stantive political context that should be more gener-
alizable to real-world situations than are examinations
of exposure to such endorsements without any ra-
tionale or context.
Three different variables allow us to ascertain the
processes of influence that explain institutional per-
suasion. If institutional opinion leadership is purely
heuristic, then one would expect a main effect of
institutional endorsements that is independent of the
rationales accompanying those endorsements. In ad-
dition, our measure of issue-relevant thought allows
us to examine whether the impact of institutional
endorsements on opinion change is concentrated
among those respondents devoid of issue-relevant
thought. An index that taps levels of objective poli-
tical information and self-perceived knowledge about
5Tests using respondents in the control condition (who received
no institutional endorsement) confirmed that affirmative action
and flag burning differed significantly from one another in the
level of commitment to opinions that they elicited. After giving
their opinion on the assigned issue, respondents were asked, on a
scale of 0 to 10 (where 10 means ‘‘completely committed,’’ and 0
means ‘‘not at all committed’’), ‘‘How committed are you to
your stand?’’ As expected, the level of commitment to attitudes
toward flag burning (mean5 8.03) was significantly stronger than
toward affirmative action (mean5 6.52; t5 4.89, p , 0.001).
6Two independent coders analyzed the open-ended verbatim
comments and demonstrated 85% agreement in assigning
respondents to these categories. Discrepancies were resolved in
favor of the more experienced coder.
7The two arguments we used were pretested and found to be
most persuasive of those tested, and roughly equally so.
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these issues allows a further test of whether low levels
of information facilitate the heuristic influence of
institutional endorsements.8 If the less sophisticated
are influenced to a greater degree by institutional
endorsements than those more high sophisticates,
this would provide further support for the heuristic
model.
The dependent variable is the respondent’s opin-
ion on the assigned issue.9 Given that the institu-
tional endorsement for both institutions at the time
supported the liberal position on each issue (against a
flag burning prohibition and for affirmative action),
higher opinion values are coded so they are more
endorsement-consistent, that is, more liberal in
orientation.
This design provides several methodological ad-
vantages in ascertaining the ability of Congress and
the Court to move mass opinion. First, the design has
a true control group that receives neither an institu-
tional endorsement nor an issue argument. This
group serves as a meaningful baseline for comparison
with issue opinions that are untainted by experimen-
tal treatments. Any significant movement away from
this baseline can be attributed to the influence of
institutional cues or the rationales provided. Past
designs have not included a control group and have
instead compared the Court’s or Congress’s influence
relative to another source, such as a high school
principal, a bureaucratic agency, or a nonpartisan
think tank (e.g., Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg
2001; Hoekstra 1995; Mondak 1990). In our study,
the control group makes it possible to know if, and in
what direction, opinions have shifted. Such shifts
may reflect ‘‘soft,’’ or incremental opinion change,
where change reflects a softening of opposition or a
strengthening of favorability, or ‘‘wholesale’’ opinion
change, where change reflects a change from oppose
to favor, or vice versa.
Second, our between-subjects design avoids the
possibility that respondents may recall being asked
the same opinion question before being told about the
institutional endorsement, thus constraining their
post-treatment opinions and/or making the study’s
purpose overly transparent (Cook and Campbell 1979).
Some previous conclusions about both Congress’s
and the Court’s ability to move opinion are based on
a within-subjects design. In Hoekstra’s (1995) study,
for example, opinions are measured both before and
after the experimental manipulations.
Third, and most importantly, our hybrid survey-
experimental design advances understanding of in-
stitutionally induced opinion change by helping to
resolve the conflicting findings generated by labora-
tory studies involving student samples (Baas and
Thomas 1984; Hoekstra 1995; Mondak 1990) and
observational and quasi-experimental studies (Franklin
and Kosaki 1989; Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Marshall
1989). Using a representative sample of Americans,
we increase external validity, yet maintain the inter-
nal validity that is the essence of experimental design.
The many complex types of heuristic and systematic
influence processes that are possible when an insti-
tution endorses a given opinion are difficult, if not
impossible, to disentangle without the control af-
forded by an experimental design with a control group.
In our analyses, we examined both whether the
institutional cues were effective and what kind of
psychological process accounted for the effects. To
begin, we examined the predictions associated with
purely heuristic influence from endorsements from
the Supreme Court as well as Congress. Further, we
examined whether more complex, hybrid models of
the persuasion process accounted for the influence of
institutional endorsements. If purely heuristic pro-
cesses of persuasion account for institutional opinion
leadership, then one might expect a main effect for
institutional endorsement, particularly for the en-
dorsement from the highly credible Supreme Court.
Even more to the point, one would expect that those
who were politically unsophisticated, or those not
engaged in processing issue-relevant thoughts to be
especially susceptible to institutional endorsements. If
opinion leadership is a result of accepting cues from
high-credibility sources and little effortful thinking
about an issue, then significant interactions would be
predicted between institutional endorsements and
sophistication and/or issue-relevant thought.
As previous evidence of interactions between
heuristic and systematic processes attest, the endorse-
ment of an institution also could be indirectly
influential through one of two hybrid processes of
influence. First, an endorsement might enhance the
persuasiveness of the substantive arguments it offers
along with its decision. In other words, apart from
the impact on opinions that any given substantive
argument might have, the same substantive argument
8Self-perceived issue-specific knowledge correlated highly with
the objective political knowledge index, so the objective and
subjective knowledge measures were combined into a single
index, which was then divided at the median to facilitate
examinations of the processes of influence among high versus
low sophisticates.
9Items were scaled such that the opinion variable was recoded
from 1 to 4, where ‘‘1’’ represents the most conservative position
on the issue (opposing laws requiring affirmative action and
favoring laws banning flag burning) and ‘‘4’’ indicates the most
liberal position on the issue.
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may receive greater attention and have greater cred-
ibility when coming from the Supreme Court rather
than from Congress. If this occurs, one would expect
to find a significant interaction between institutional
endorsement and the rationale/argument given with
it, such that the endorsement enhances the credibility
of the argument and thus leads public opinion in the
suggested direction. Second, as suggested by cognitive
response theory, institutional endorsements may
cause people to ponder the rationales for the deci-
sions, along with or even in the absence of any official
explanations or rationales. If the explanations people
are prompted to generate support the endorsement,
their opinions will be shifted in that direction as a
result. In other words, the institutional endorsement
sets in motion a persuasive process in which the
citizen also participates. If this is the case, we would
expect to find that an institutional endorsement
increases the proportion of endorsement-consistent
issue-relevant thoughts generated by the respondent.
Then by virtue of these arguments tilted in the
direction of the institutional decision, persuasion
occurs.
Results
To analyze these experimental data, we used an
analysis of variance for each institution comparing
the control condition respondents to both the Con-
gress and Supreme Court conditions. Each model
included three experimental factors (issue, institu-
tion, and accompanying substantive argument
present versus absent), plus political sophistication
and a measure of whether the person engaged in
issue-relevant thought. To improve the efficiency of
these models, we also included standard demographic
and party identification variables as covariates (see
Franklin 1991). We begin with analyses of how
institutional cues directly affect opinions and then
examine them in interactions that allow us to hone in
on processes of influence. We then turn to the effects
of these manipulations on cognitive responses and
their potential to mediate opinion change. We
include the full analysis of variance results in the
online Appendix B and describe the findings relevant
to our theoretical predictions in the text and figures,
along with the relevant statistical tests.10
As shown in Figure 1, the main effect for the
Supreme Court endorsement relative to the control
condition was significant, but the endorsement by
Congress had no such significant impact, although its
effect is in the predicted direction. Apparently, the
Court can indeed use its institutional credibility to
move public opinion in the direction of its endorse-
ment. Figure 2 simply demonstrates that the issue
arguments we provided were consistently influential
in changing opinions in the direction anticipated.
The arguments themselves—when and if such argu-
ments accompany news of institutional decisions—
may influence opinions via systematic processing of
issue-relevant arguments, independent of any institu-
tional endorsement of them.
More to the point, in Figure 3, we examine
whether people with low levels of political sophisti-
cation were more likely to be influenced by institu-
tional cues, consistent with the heuristic theory of the
impact of endorsements. Contrary to these expect-
ations, Figure 3 shows that there was no difference
in the impact of the Supreme Court endorsement
among low- and high-sophistication respondents.
Both those high and low in sophistication responded
similarly to the Court endorsement. In contrast,
the endorsement of Congress followed the heuris-
tic expectation faithfully, producing a significant
deviation from the control condition for those low
in sophistication, but none for the more politically
sophisticated.
These results suggest that Congress’s ability to
move opinion is heuristic, perhaps because those low
in political sophistication also perceive Congress as
more expert than those high in sophistication,
whereas the reverse pattern is true for the credibility
of the Court. That is, respondents high in political
sophistication are more likely than those low in so-
phistication to see the Court as having great exper-
tise.11 Overall, these findings in Figures 1, 2, and 3
suggest that both systematic and heuristic processes
of persuasion can independently contribute to opin-
ion change, assuming the substantive arguments are
communicated and persuasive. That is, people are
10All means illustrated in the tables use adjusted cell means
resulting from the analysis of variance; that is, they illustrate the
impact of a single experimental variable when all other elements
in the model are held constant.
11Indeed, the mean perception of expertise for Congress for low-
sophistication control group respondents (who thus received no
source cue) was 2.5, and for high sophistication respondents who
received no cues, mean expertise was 2.18. This difference falls
just short of conventional levels of statistical significance (t5 1.57,
p5 0.12; two-tailed test). The same pattern does not hold for the
Court; in fact, it is in the reverse direction (mean5 2.86 for low
sophisticates and mean5 2.98 for high sophisticates), and the
difference was not significant.
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influenced simultaneously by both the institutional
endorsement as well as by any issue-relevant argu-
ments provided. Heuristic and systematic processing
operate side by side, and we see little evidence that
engaging in one process makes the other less
influential.12
Aside from direct effects on issue opinions, we
have also suggested that institutional endorsements
might bring about opinion change indirectly by
producing issue-relevant thoughts, that is, cognitive
responses that help individuals explain to themselves
why a given decision was produced by an institution.
As illustrated in Figure 4, those who generated issue-
relevant cognitive responses according to our thought-
listing measure were more likely to shift opinions in
the predicted direction relative to the control con-
dition, and this pattern was the same for both insti-
tutions. A heuristic model would predict that those
who were not engaged in issue-relevant thinking
would be more influenced by institutional endorse-
ments. But, surprisingly, this interaction suggests
precisely the opposite result. While the Court was
successful in persuading people in the predicted di-
rection regardless of issue-relevant thought, Congress
was only able to move the opinions of those who did
engage in issue-relevant thought and failed to do so
among those who did not. What this finding suggests
is that even a low-credibility institution such as
Congress can produce opinion change if it enhances
the amount and direction of cognitive responses that
people generate internally.
Our final analyses in Table 1 and Figure 5
examines whether the impact of institutional en-
dorsements is, in fact, facilitated by the cues’ effects
on cognitive responses. In other words, do institu-
tional endorsements work at least in part by causing
those who hear about these institutions’ positions to
think more deeply about the issue and why the
institution has decided at it has? If this is the case,
then it matters little whether decision rationales are
communicated to the public, since the ones they
generate may be more persuasive still. In Table 1, we
examine whether institutional endorsements are
capable of altering the proportion of issue-relevant
thoughts that are consistent with the direction of each
institution’s endorsement. In other words, does it
cause people to rehearse thoughts consistent with the
decision? We tested this hypothesis separately for
each institutional endorsement relative to the control
condition using as the dependent variable the pro-
portion of endorsement-consistent issue-relevant
thoughts.13
As shown in Table 1, not surprisingly, the well-
educated and those who were given a persuasive
argument as part of the experiment were able to
generate more issue-relevant thoughts, whether the
cue was from Congress or the Court. As demonstra-
ted by the findings for the Supreme Court in the first
column of Table 1, the Court is capable of significantly
enhancing the amount of endorsement-consistent
FIGURE 1 The Impact of Institutional
Endorsements on Mass Opinion
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Note: Entries are mean issue opinion scores based on a 1-4 scale. 
For the Supreme Court, N = 490; for Congress, N = 508. Analysis 
of variance produced a statistically significant main effect for the 
Supreme Court (F = 8.11, p < 0.01) and a statistically insignifi-
cant main effect for Congress (F = 0.47, p = 0.49). 
FIGURE 2 The Impact of Issue Arguments on
Opinion
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Note: Bars represent mean issue opinion scores based on a 1-4 
scale. For the Supreme Court, N = 490; for Congress, N = 508. 
Analysis of variance produced a statistically significant main effect 
for issue argument for both the Supreme Court (F = 5.52, p < 0.05) 
and Congress (F = 12.87, p < 0.01).
12There is some marginal evidence that the presence of the issue
argument attenuates the effects of the Court’s endorsement (i.e.,
an endorsement by issue argument interaction), but this pattern
is only marginally significant.
13More specifically, the measure is the number of endorsement-
consistent thoughts divided by the total number of thoughts
generated.
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FIGURE 3 The Ability of the Supreme Court and
Congress to Change Opinion, by
Sophistication Level
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Note: Each bar represents the difference in the mean of issue 
opinion for the specified condition relative to the control group 
condition (no institutional endorsement); positive values 
represent opinion change in the direction of the institutional 
endorsement. For the Supreme Court, N = 490; for Congress, N = 
508. Analysis of variance produced a statistically insignificant 
endorsement by sophistication interaction for the Court (F = 
0.34, p = 0.56) and a statistically significant interaction for 
Congress (F = 4.47, p < 0.05).
FIGURE 4 The Ability of the Supreme Court and
Congress to Change Opinion via
Issue-Relevant Thought
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Note: Each bar represents the difference in the mean of issue 
opinion for the specified condition relative to the control group 
condition (no institutional endorsement); positive values 
represent opinion change in the direction of the institutional 
endorsement. For the Supreme Court, N = 490; for Congress, N = 
508. Analysis of variance produced a statistically insignificant 
endorsement by cognitive response interaction for the Court (F = 
1.20, p = 0.27) and a statistically significant interaction for 
Congress (F = 4.01, p < 0.05).
TABLE 1 Analysis of Variance – The Impact of Congress and the Supreme Court on the Proportion of
Endorsement-Consistent Issue-Relevant Thoughts
SUPREME COURT CONGRESS
Sum of
Squares df F p
Sum of
Squares df F p
MAIN EFFECTS
Institutional Endorsement 0.64 1 4.99 0.03 0.12 1 1.01 0.32
Issue 0.02 1 0.13 0.72 0.65 1 5.61 0.02
Argument 0.57 1 4.40 0.04 0.32 1 2.78 0.10
Political Sophistication 0.35 1 2.67 0.10 1.63 1 14.00 0.00
2-WAY INTERACTIONS
Inst. Endorsement*Issue 0.01 1 0.07 0.80 0.36 1 3.12 0.08
Inst. Endorsement*Argument 0.04 1 0.27 0.60 0.21 1 1.78 0.18
Inst. Endorsement*Sophistication 0.00 1 0.00 0.99 0.19 1 1.65 0.20
Issue*Argument 0.01 1 0.11 0.74 0.08 1 0.67 0.41
Issue*Sophistication 0.02 1 0.18 0.67 1.39 1 11.99 0.00
Argument*Sophistication 0.02 1 0.17 0.68 0.18 1 1.51 0.22
COVARIATES
Education 2.95 1 22.86 0.00 2.18 1 18.78 0.00
Age 0.00 1 0.01 0.91 0.24 1 2.03 0.15
Sex 0.03 1 0.19 0.66 0.18 1 1.54 0.22
Race 0.21 1 1.62 0.20 0.56 1 4.79 0.03
Income 0.04 1 0.30 0.58 0.28 1 2.40 0.12
Republican 0.29 1 2.24 0.13 0.14 1 1.19 0.28
Democrat 0.30 1 2.29 0.13 0.67 1 5.75 0.02
Model 6.92 17 3.16 0.00 12.26 17 6.21 0.00
N 5 490 N 5 509
Note: Results based on analysis of variance with covariates included in model.
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issue-relevant thought relative to the control group.
The Court’s institutional endorsement caused people
to mentally rehearse more issue-consistent substan-
tive arguments supporting the decision. This finding
is consistent with our expectation that a high-credibility
source such as the Court is capable of enhancing the
extent and direction of issue-relevant thinking in a
persuasion context.
For Congress, as shown in column 2 of Table 1, the
main effect of institutional endorsement is not signi-
ficant, but the endorsement by issue interaction shows
that a congressional endorsement enhanced the propor-
tion of endorsement-consistent issue-relevant thoughts
for affirmative action (the low-commitment issue),
though not for flag burning (the high-commitment
issue). As shown in Figure 5, at least for affirmative
action, even a low-credibility source such as Congress
was capable of inducing people to rehearse issue-
relevant thoughts in the direction of its advocacy.
Substantially more pro-affirmative action thoughts
were rehearsed by those who received the Congress
cue relative to those in the control condition. How-
ever, supportive thoughts relevant to flag burning
were not affected by the congressional endorsement.
To summarize our findings, the Court’s institu-
tional endorsement triggered multiple processes of
persuasion: as a heuristic capable of moving opinion
in a passive fashion and as an impetus for more
active and mindful issue-relevant thinking in the
direction of its endorsement. If the endorsement
happened to be accompanied by persuasive substan-
tive arguments and explanations, then its persuasive-
ness would be still further enhanced. Like the Court,
Congress’s endorsement also appears to play multiple
roles. The congressional endorsement (1) significantly
changed opinions specifically among low-information
respondents, and (2) enhanced endorsement-consistent
issue-relevant thoughts for the low-commitment
affirmative action issue, and thus facilitated endorse-
ment-consistent opinion influence for that issue.
These effects are more powerful than we expected
from a low-credibility source such as Congress.
Of course, some caution should be exercised in
generalizing our findings as our study has some limi-
tations that are common to experiments. Most ob-
viously, it is limited to only two controversial issues,
two substantive arguments, and two institutions,
which cannot claim to represent all potential persua-
sive contexts in which institutions render decisions.
Moreover, these particular issues are much better
known and understood by the public than many
highly technical pieces of legislation decided by
Congress or decisions made by the Court. We dem-
onstrate persuasive influence for both high- and low-
commitment issues among the realm of issues for
which significant numbers of people are likely to hear
about court decisions. However, over the broader
range of issues faced by these institutions, these issues
would be considered relatively high profile, and thus
harder to talk people out of. Issues that are high
profile increase the likelihood that people would be
exposed to these decisions and their rationales in the
real world, but that same notoriety also lessens the
likelihood of persuasive influence simply because
the issues are already well known and widely debated.
Nonetheless, relative to most experiments done in
laboratory settings with student populations, our
study population is far more generalizable to the real
world.
The effects we have documented are statistically
significant, but are they large enough to make a
difference in the climate of opinion in the United
States? On the one hand, a single one-shot stimulus
administered by phone is a relatively weak induce-
ment relative to living in a country where that de-
cision outcome constitutes the law of the land.
Repeated exposure to these outcomes might conceiv-
ably reinforce or increase the size of these short term
effects. On the other hand, was the influence enough
to make a real difference in mass opinion? In order to
address this question through more than simple
FIGURE 5 The Ability of Congress to Change the
Proportion of Endorsement-Consistent
Issue-Relevant Thoughts, by Issue
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Note: Each bar represents the difference in the mean of the 
proportion of endorsement-consistent thoughts for the specified 
condition relative to the control group condition (no institu-
tional endorsement); positive values represent change in the 
direction of the endorsement. N = 509. Analysis of variance 
produced a marginally significant endorsement by issue interac-
tion (F = 3.12, p = 0.08).
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speculation, we replicated the same analyses shown
above after dichotomizing our opinion measures into
simply favor versus oppose. We then used logit
regressions with these dichotomous dependent vari-
ables in order to determine whether the strength of
influence was sufficient to turn those in favor into
those who oppose these issues, or whether it was
more likely to weaken existing predispositions. For
the most part, our findings suggest that the persua-
sive influence we observed was of the softer variety,
that is, moving people from strongly opposing to
only somewhat opposing, or from somewhat favoring
to strongly favoring. The institutional endorsements
generally soften respondents’ existing positions in the
direction of the institution’s decision, but do not
often wholly change them from opposition to advo-
cacy. The one exception to this pattern occurs in the
most purely heuristic situation, when a high-credibility
Supreme Court endorsement is administered without
any accompanying issue argument. Under these con-
ditions, the probability of supporting the institution’s
decision goes from .34 with no endorsement, to .47
with the Supreme Court’s endorsement, a significant
persuasive influence from opposing to supporting
flag burning and affirmative action.14 Though a
further examination is beyond the scope of this study,
future research should investigate this issue more
extensively.
Implications for Institutional
Opinion Leadership
Can institutions lead public opinion? Our study sug-
gests that the answer to this question is yes, but
specifying the conditions under which one should
expect influence is more complex, because influence
is not simply a matter of ‘‘empty-headed’’ people
looking to credible sources for cues about what to
think. At this point in the progression of research on
institutional persuasion, a more useful question for
scholars to ask is: which institutions can influence
which segments of the population under what con-
ditions and with what issues using what process of
persuasive influence? Research oriented in this fash-
ion should better shed light on the extent to which
and conditions under which institutions are capable
of moving public opinion.
As expected, the Court is more influential than
Congress in using its institutional credibility to move
opinion, and it can do so fairly unconditionally, re-
gardless of people’s sophistication levels, levels of
issue relevant thinking, or the presence of issue-
relevant arguments. Thus, the processes by which
the Court leads mass opinion are both heuristic and
systematic forms of influence. The Court is capable of
inducing opinion change not only because it is a
credible source, but also because of the persuasiveness
of the reasons that accompany its decisions and the
stimulation of more mindful issue-relevant thoughts
in the direction of its advocacy. The dual capacity of
the Court’s influence is important in understanding
institutional opinion leadership, but our findings
were particularly surprising with respect to Con-
gress’s capacity to move opinion in ways heretofore
not understood by scholars. The congressional en-
dorsement significantly influenced the views of the
less sophisticated and generated more endorsement-
consistent thoughts, which ultimately facilitated its
indirect influence on attitudes toward affirmative
action. In short, Congress’s role as opinion leader
may be more potent than many have assumed.
Importantly, our results indicate that the pro-
cesses of influence involved in opinion leadership are
less ‘‘empty-headed’’ than typically assumed. For
both the Court and Congress analyses, we uncovered
evidence that people were engaged in active and
mindful processing of issue-relevant thoughts. From
a normative legal reasoning point of view, rationales
or logical bases are necessary to justify a legal con-
clusion. Particularly for the Court, but also for
Congress to a degree, our findings imply that while
citizens are prone to persuasion by mere institutional
endorsements, rationales and arguments are also
potent instruments of institutional persuasion.
Contrary to the typical predictions based on the
heuristic model, those engaged in issue relevant
thinking were more persuaded by the congressional
endorsement, a finding contradicting our initial
expectations. This finding led us to suspect that even
a low-credibility institution such as Congress was
capable of enhancing issue-relevant thoughts in the
direction of its endorsement. We found some evi-
dence for this effect in the case of affirmative action.
For a low-commitment issue such as affirmative
action, Congress is capable of prompting people to
14In the logit model for the Court, the endorsement by issue
argument interaction was statistically significant (p , .05, one-
tailed test). To generate the predicted probabilities, we used a
postestimation procedure akin to Clarify (King, Tomz, and
Wittenberg 2000). We could not use Clarify directly because it
does not perform analysis on a model with a poststratification
weight. Thus, we computed average predictive comparisons (see
Gelman and Hill 2007, 101–105), which are appropriate in the
context of experimental data.
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rehearse endorsement-consistent thoughts. The direction
of these thoughts accounts for persuasive influence,
and thus, our findings suggest that issue-relevant
thinking mediates the impact of Congress’s endorse-
ments on opinion change. The Court is also capable
of significantly increasing endorsement-consistent
thoughts, and its effect carries across both affirmative
action and flag burning. These findings support the
notion that institutional endorsements can serve
multiple roles, both as direct effects on opinions and
as effects on the extent of endorsement-consistent
thinking.
Overall, our findings show that each institution
affects opinion in more nuanced ways than simple
heuristic processing models would have one believe.
Unfortunately, most previous designs have not been
able to distinguish between purely heuristic processes,
systematic processes, and hybrid combinations thereof.
Our findings warn against continuing to stress the
importance of simple heuristic processing while failing
to address more complex and substantive processes of
persuasion.Most importantly, our study demonstrates
that opinion leadership does not necessarily mean
persuasion without political substance. The influence
of institutional endorsements depends to a great extent
on the rationales for those endorsements that aremade
public. In other words, there is a great deal more
political substance in opinion leadership than most
scholars have thought. Moreover, the conditions for
influence by an opinion leader like Congress have to do
with the pool of political arguments—pro and con—in
the public sphere at the time, because they provide
the sets of arguments that may be rehearsed by
individuals in cognitive responses. The kind of opinion
leadership we see in our study is neither deterministic
nor mindless; it incorporates the give and take of
political arguments between elites and the mass
public, and it is not independent of the strength of
those arguments. Our findings strongly suggest that
institutional opinion leadership may prove more
mindful and politically substantive than previously
thought.
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